Friday, November 20, 2015

5.4 AN ANALYSIS OF SHIFT SCHEDULE ROTATIONS

Running head: AN ANALYSIS OF SHIFT SCHEDULE ROTATIONS…………...……………1
An Analysis of Shift Schedule Rotations to allow for 24/7 UAS Operations
Conducted by 4 Teams
Robert J. Winn
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-WW-ASCI 638

Abstract
This research paper will present an analysis of a shift schedule for a MQ-1B Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) UAS squadron of the United States Air Force (USAF). The schedule, based on a 6 days on, 2 days off rotational format in order to accommodate missions conducted 24/7, 365 days a year providing armed, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to forces operating in country. In order to accomplish this mission, the UAS crews were divided into 4 teams and assigned a shift work schedule of 6 days on, 2 days off. Under this shift schedule crew members have reported extreme fatigue while conducting operations due to a lack of quality sleep. In order to optimize operations a revised shift schedule will be introduced in order to address the fatigue issue reported by the crews. In conclusion, an analysis of the current schedule will address the pros and cons compared to the revised shift schedule.
Keywords: fatigue, inadequate sleep, optimized operations, shift schedule,

An Analysis of Shift Schedule Rotations to allow for 24/7 UAS Operations
Conducted by 4 Teams
The introduction of long-endurance unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), such as the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper, has necessitated the routine implementation of shift work for United States Air Force (USAF) UAS crewmembers in order to provide the necessary around-the-clock staffing of ground control stations (Tvaryanas, 2008). A current 4 team shift schedule to accommodate 24/7, 365 days a year operations by MQ-1B USAF crews has introduced reports of increased fatigue attributed to inadequate sleep. The 2 cycle shift schedule requires 4 crews to alternate between 12 hour day (1st cycle) and night (2nd cycle) shifts by working 6 days on then two days off and then rotating to the alternate 12 cycle for the next 6/2 rotation.
A study by Barnes & Matz in 1998, found Army UAS operators preferred longer over shorter rotations because they perceived the longer rotations allowed for better situational awareness of the tactical environment (Tvaryanas, 2006). It could be that the longer rotation preferred by the crews was to that of the shift duration (12 hours) and not to the cycle of six days on. Another study showed that shift-working crewmembers in a Predator UAS squadron had significantly increased fatigue, emotional exhaustion, and burnout relative to traditional aircrew from another “high-demand, low-density” weapon system. The squadron work schedule was redesigned, but preferred shift work practices were not fully implemented because of manpower constraints and crewmember preferences (Tvaryanas, 2008).
Fatigue/Stress
Fatigue is a “State of diminished Physical or mental efficiency”. Fatigue can be triggered by previous perceived stress which may lead to impairment of performance and function (Kocalevent, 2011). The state of being fatigued has an effect on an individual’s capability to handle given levels of stress. The major causes of fatigue are; Sleep Loss, Work Schedule, Circadian Rhythm Disruptions, Recreational or Extracurricular Activity
Stress is a complex phenomenon brought about by the pressures that life or a given situation present. Factors that affect stress are Individual, Environmental and Occupational. The inability to socialize with family and community can exacerbate individual stressors, those stressors can compound issues attributed to increased fatigue brought about by diminished physical or mental efficiency. How an individual handles stress can have a direct effect on the individual’s ability to decompress, get restful sleep and recharge both the physical and mental state of being.
8 vs. 12
Numerous studies have concluded that for each hour past an 8 hour shift the risk and potential for error increased by one. These errors were also more likely to occur during a night shift where disruption of natural circadian rhythm occurs. In order to minimize the overall risk on a shift system we need to consider the number of successive night shifts, the length of the night shifts and the pro-vision of breaks within them (Tvaryanas, 2008). Additional studies found that a 12 hr. night shift that included frequent rest breaks might well prove safer than a shorter 8 hr. night shift with only a single, mid-shift break. Likewise, the length of the night shifts and the number of successive night shifts involved in a shift system will act in combination to determine the overall risk on that system (Folkard, 2003).
Work Cycle Duration
Shift worker fatigue has been described as a function of shift timing, length, frequency, and regularity as well as intrashift and intershift recovery opportunities (Tvaryanas, 2008). Shift workers experience a wide range of problems from acute disturbances of circadian rhythms and sleep to diminished family and social lives (Tvaryanas, 2008). If the number of successive night shifts is directly attributed to errors brought about by fatigue and circadian rhythm disruptions, than it would stand to reason the current 6 day on -2 day off cycle is not the optimal schedule for ensuring safe UAS operations. Therefore a revised shift schedule to accommodate the 4 UAS teams has been developed.
2-2/3-2/2-3 Rotating Shift Schedule | 24/7 Shift Coverage
The length of the night shifts and the number of successive night shifts involved in a shift system will act in combination to determine the overall risk on that system (Folkard, 2003). Implementing a 2-2/3-2/2-3 rotating shift schedule using 4 teams (crews) and 2 twelve-hour shifts to provide 24/7 coverage provides the individual crews with less exposure to prolonged 12 hour night shift rotations (Figure 1). Implemented over a 4-week cycle each team works 2 consecutive day shifts, followed by 2 days off, returning to work for 3 consecutive day shifts, followed by another 2 days off, then returning for another 2 consecutive day shifts, followed by 3 days off duty. The cycle then repeats itself but the crews are then assigned to the night shift for the same 2-2/3-2/2-3 cycle.


Figure 1. 2-2/3-2/2-3 rotating shift schedule Retrieved from http://www.bmscentral.com/learn-employee-scheduling/2-2-3-2-2-3-rotating-shift/
It should be considered that although the shift durations are in 12 hour increments a minimum of 15 minutes of overlap would be added by the outgoing dayshift crew in order to provide for a positive hand-off to the gaining night shift crew.
Pros • No employee works more than three consecutive days
• 3-day weekend every other weekend
• Taking 2 vacation days on one of the 2-day work week gives 7 days off
Cons • Could work up to 62 hours in one week
• Long shift length (12 hours)
• Requires an average of 2 overtime hours per employee per week
(BMS, 2015)
Conclusion
M.J Thorpy presented in the Journal of Family Practice, (V59, No.1, 2010), that there was a marked increase in the risk for incidents during working hours suggests that working more than 4 consecutive 12-hour night shifts should be avoided. Therefore, shift crews should be made aware that a potential exists for increased errors towards the end of a 12 hour shift. Shift schedules should rotate clockwise rather than counterclockwise manner as it has been found easier to change the sleep/wake cycle to a clockwise shift rotation, as this follows the natural adaptive pattern of delaying the sleep period. Additional ways to improve the sleep –wake cycle is to improve shift-work conditions, such as bright light exposure and appropriately timed naps.

Dr. D. Schroeder presented in a 2008 FAA Fatigue Management Symposium the following:
Summary
• No single shift rotation plan can entirely resolve the work and rest scheduling demands placed on individuals
• Discussion of specific advantages and risks difficult due to great diversity of flexible and irregular hours
• Given the variability of flexible hours, focus should be on the actual working hours of employees and the timing of their sleep
Recommendations
• Employ ergonomic principles of scheduling as possible
• Shift rotation time should be no less than 10 hrs

References
BMS, Business management Systems (2015), 2-2 3-2 2-3 Rotating Shift Schedule | 24/7 Shift Coverage Retrieved from http://www.bmscentral.com/learn-employee-scheduling/2-2-3-2-2-3-rotating-shift/
Kocalevent, R. D., Hinz, A., Brahler, E., Klapp, B. F., (2011) Determinants of fatigue and stress Research article from BMC Research notes 2011, 4:238 Retrieved from http://www.biomedcentral.com/1756-0500/4/238
Folkard, S., Tucker, P.T., (2003) Shift Work, Safety and productivity Retrieved from Department of Psychology, Swansea University, Swansea, Wales, United Kingdom Occupational Medicine (Impact Factor: 1.03). 04/2003; 53(2):95-101. DOI: 10.1093/occmed/kqg047
Schroeder, D. Ph.D., (2008) Sleep/Wake Cycles and Performance of ATC Operators Presented at the FAA Fatigue Management Symposium, June 17-19, 2008 Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/afs/afs200/media/aviation_fatigue_symposium/SchroederAppComplete.pdf
Thorpy, M.J., (2010) Managing the patient with shift-work disorder, Supplement to the Journal of Family Practice, Vol 59, No 1., January 2010, Retrieved from http://media.mycme.com/documents/29/culpepper_2010_swd_suppl_7021.pdf
Tvaryanas, A.P., Lopez, N., Hickey, P., Daluz, C., Thompson, W. T., Caldwell, J.L. (2006) Effects of Shift Work and Sustained Operations: Operator Performance in Remotely Piloted Aircraft (OP-REPAIR) Retrieved from http://www.wpafb.af.mil/shared/media/document/afd-090121-043.pdf
Tvaryanas, A.P., Platte, W., Swigart, C., Colebank, J., Miller, N.L., (2008) A Resurvey of Shift Work-Related Fatigue in MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aircraft System Crewmembers Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA477976

4.6 INSITU SCANEAGLE-ESTABLISHING A PATH


Running head: INSITU SCANEAGLE-ESTABLISHING A PATH

Insitu ScanEagle-Establishing a path for UAS to operate Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS)
Robert J. Winn
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-WW-ASCI638

Abstract
This paper presents the attributes of the Insitu ScanEagle and how this unmanned aerial system (UAS) is equipped to conduct operations beyond line of sight (BLOS) of the operator. It will present the needed infrastructure to support the flight operations and identify the necessary support equipment, what additional personnel are required, their roles and what procedures are in place to ensure the UAS operates safely in the National Airspace System (NAS). A comparison between BLOS and line of sight (LOS) operations will be discussed to show the advantages and disadvantages of each of these methods and what unique human factors are associated with switching between each method of operation. In closing, the paper will identify a current operation or Pathfinder currently in the test phase, through joint participation with industry and the FAA that encourages the private use of a UAS while operating under BLOS capabilities.
Keywords: BLOS, support equipment, human factors, pathfinder, personnel, procedures

Insitu ScanEagle-Establishing a Path for UAS to Operate

Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS)
The Insitu ScanEagle, classified as a small unmanned aircraft system or sUAS has a max takeoff weight of <55 lbs. and is capable of operating beyond line of sight (BLOS). Due to its small environmental foot print the ScanEagle is nearly undetectable and can remain airborne for more than 24 hours with a service ceiling of 15,000 feet. Comprised of a video datalink in both analog and digitally encrypted feed and a Command and Control or C2 datalink that is both encrypted and non-encrypted its capable of delivering live video feeds allowing the operator to stay one step ahead of any situation. Infrastructure The System is comprised of four primary elements, 1) the UA 2) the Mark 4 ground launcher (trailer mounted, pneumatically actuated, expeditionary 3) Ground Control Station or GCS (point and click command enabling semiautonomous real time control) 4) SkyHook (runway independent cable recovery system, requires no nets) and 5) Operating Crew (by type certification consists of (1) Pilot and (1) ground crew member (aids in the launch and recovery operations). In addition to the primary system elements, the necessary support equipment to enable BLOS operations is the GPS satellite relay, the satellite data link and the satellite uplink vehicle. Not normally addressed as support equipment or part of the system, but an aspect of crew resource management (CRM) is the coordination/communication with Air Traffic Controllers that provide essential operator feedback regarding manned air operations or other obstacles within the vicinity of the UA, so that predetermined mitigations can be enacted upon. Line of Sight
Line of Sight (LOS) operations refers to the ability to provide command and control of the UA via direct up-link /down-link between the GCS and the UA. Operating under LOS offers advantages over BLOS by minimizing the infrastructure, such as satellite relay/data link support equipment, needed to perform C2 of the UA. However a disadvantage to operating under LOS is that the extended range capabilities of the UA are restricted, i.e. the UA cannot travel out of direct signal reception of the GCS uplink antennas or C2 and data downlink is affected.
Beyond Line of Sight
Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) operations refer to UAS operations via a satellite link (GPS) that reaches “over the horizon”. This allows the operator to control the UA from considerably longer distances where a ground based-direct line of sight (LOS) datalink may be hindered by extending beyond the horizon or behind obstacles, such as mountains. A clear disadvantage is the additional infrastructure required to provide BLOS capability (e.g. Satellite relay, Satellite data link and the Satellite uplink vehicle).
Crew Resource Management-CRM
As stated in an ERAU-ASCI 638 presentation (2013), “Typically there is a delay of approximately 2 seconds from operator input to the controls to execution of commands by the aircraft; this makes takeoff and landing procedures difficult if not impossible due to the need to rapidly respond to changes during critical phases of flight. To work around this problem, there is usually a separate Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) crew and Mission Crew Element (MCE) that work together to accomplish the entire flight. Good CRM between these two elements is crucial to safe operations and involves many human factors issues that can cause problems if not executed properly. Precise coordination, timing, communication, and duplicated settings in the GCS are critical because a breakdown of any one of these factors can cause an accident or incident. Common procedures, checklists and training are essential components of successful BLOS operations.” To enhance CRM between the pilot (MCE) and ground crew (LRE) Insitu implemented robust GCS software referred to as I-MUSE.
I-MUSE
I-MUSE (Insitu Multiple UAS Software Environment): provides the interface between the pilot and the ScanEagle aircraft. The software capabilities directly enhance the pilot’s ability to multitask operational requirements. I-MUSE functionality includes: plan flights; launch aircraft; operate the aircraft in flight; monitor the aircraft and the data collection; and recover the aircraft. I-MUSE is factory-installed on all GCS and provides the pilot with situational awareness information via visual displays of terrain, obstacles, altitudes, etc. (similar to a manned aircraft flight deck). It also provides multiple checklists to perform pre-flight; post-flight; and emergency tasks. Finally, since I-MUSE is the mission planning interface, the pilot may load maps, elevation information, satellite imagery, etc., to assist with mission planning. Overlays are permitted in I-MUSE to alert the pilot of no fly zones and air traffic corridors (Murray, 2013).
Pathfinder
In collaboration with the Federal Aviation Administration, while conducting operations in New Mexico, Insitu (a Boeing subsidiary) launched the first sUAS to perform commercial BLOS operations within the continental United States (Insitu, 2015). This particular Pathfinder will provide necessary data to show the abilities of BLOS operations while the ScanEagle performs video inspections and analysis of predetermined sections of the BNSF railway.

References
Insitu, Inc. (2015) Insitu Unmanned Aircraft Conducts Railway Monitoring, Historic First Flight with BNSF Railway, Retrieved from http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/insitu-unmanned-aircraft-conducts-railway-monitoring-historic-first-flight-with-bnsf-railway-300167570.html
Murray, T., Eastwick, J., Evans, C. (2013) White Paper: System Safety Assessment for ScanEagle Type Certificate with limitations (Restricted Category) Date: May 17, 2013 Rev. 0.0
















3.5 Research: UAS Integration in the NAS
Robert J Winn
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-WW-ASCI638
The FAA is developing a project called the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). What are the goals of NextGen, and how does it seek to improve future aviation operations in the NAS?
By changing from a ground-based radar system to satellite based GPS system, NextGen hopes to improve air commerce in the NAS by providing direct routes to destinations (saving time and operating costs), by reducing traffic delays, by increasing capacity and to allow air traffic controllers greater flexibility in managing aircraft operations with increased safety.
Where UAS/NAS integration is concerned, the ultimate goal is to enable a responsive, efficient, timely, coordinated multiagency research and development (R&D) effort that will enable the U.S. to realize fully the benefits of UAS operations in the NAS (Next, 2012).
To ensure this goal is realized a NextGen Unmanned Aircraft Systems Research, Development and Demonstration Roadmap was created. The development and demonstration objectives are intended to address the sense-and-avoid capability for UAS operating in any given density within the NAS. The Roadmap also takes into consideration that “achieving safe UAS integration depends on a complex set of regulatory, technical, economic, and political factors that must be addressed in an integrated and systematic fashion” (Next, 2012).
How do UAS fit into this vision for the future keeping in mind the research you have done on Detect, Sense, and Avoid requirements, and Lost Link scenarios?
In order for UAS to safely integrate the NAS, they will require advanced autonomous technology and standards to avoid other traffic and must mitigate the safety concern regarding loss of communications within the HMI.
Since UAS are unmanned, they have no capability to perform see and avoid mitigations currently required of manned operations. Therefore, some yet to be approved sensory equipment, radar, or operations under visual line of sight (VLOS) must be implemented for this regulatory requirement. The Government Accountability Office (GAO), reported in 2008 that “no technology had been identified as a suitable substitute for a person on board the aircraft in seeing and avoiding other aircraft. Additionally, UASs’ communications and control links are vulnerable to unintentional or intentional radio interference that can lead to loss of control of an aircraft and an accident.”
By 2020, manned aircraft will be required to incorporate continuously improved technologies such as Automated Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) in order to comply with NextGen expectations. As the “payload-envelope” of this technology is reduced and its operating capabilities enhanced, it will contribute significantly to the ability of all manned and unmanned operations in the NAS.
What human factors issues or challenges do you foresee with the implementation of NextGen and the integration of UAS?
Loss-of Link (LOL) during UAS operation in the NAS is probably the most critical factor in the human –machine interface (HMI). Should LOL occur while the UAS is in flight the operator has no ability to implement an evasive maneuver should another aircraft enter into the operating vicinity of the UAS. A study conducted on behalf of ERAU students specifically focused the HMI of UASs and the vulnerabilities of a LOL scenario. The results conveyed four functional goals including: pre-mission building and entering the emergency return profile, updating the lost link profile, detecting lost link and responding to lost link (Kaste, 2012).
References
GAO-08-511, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Federal Actions needed to Ensure safety and Expand Their Potential Uses within the National Airspace System, Published: May 15, 2008 Publicly released May 15, 2008 retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-511
Kaste, K.; Archer, J.; Neville, K.; Blickensderfer, B.; Luxion, S., "An analysis of FAA certification regulations and guidelines for evaluating the unmanned aircraft human-machine interface: Lost link," in Systems and Information Design Symposium (SIEDS), 2012 IEEE , vol., no., pp.150-155, 27-27 April 2012
doi: 10.1109/SIEDS.2012.6215149
Next Generation Air Transportation System, NextGen UAS Research, Development and Demonstration Roadmap Version 1.0, March 15, 2012 retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas-nextgen.pdf