Sunday, December 6, 2015

7.6 IMPLEMENTING OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT

Running head: IMPLEMENTING OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 1
Implementing Operational Risk Management to Improve
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Missions
Robert J. Winn
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-WW-ASCI638


Abstract
The unmanned aircraft system (UAS) industry has been growing at a significant rate. This growth has identified the need to establish risk assessment and hazard analysis mitigations to address unforeseen safety issues related to these systems and their operations. The UAS operational phase can be subdivide into several general stages: planning, staging, launch, flight, and recovery. Applying the appropriate hazard analysis tool within each stage will allow for early identification and ultimately early resolution of safety issues. This research paper will identify a small UAS (SUAS) that is currently in use in either the commercial or military sector and present an Operational Risk Management (ORM) assessment tool that can be used by the sUAS operators to safely assess their ability to accomplish the mission. This paper will also show the development of the ORM assessment tool by presenting a Preliminary Hazard List (PHL), a Preliminary Hazard Assessment (PHA) and the Operational Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A) and when used together provides sUAS operators the ability to safely integrate the National Airspace System (NAS).
Keyword: Analysis, Assessment, Hazard, Operations, Risk,


Implementing Operational Risk Management to Improve
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Missions
System safety is essential for both manned and unmanned systems when operating in the NAS. In a paper presented by Donald E. Gramp of the FAA, dated October 29, 2010, he stated:
“Small unmanned aircraft, as with other unmanned aircraft, are operated by a pilot physically separated from the aircraft. This renders the pilot incapable of conforming to the provisions of 14 CFR 91.113 with respect to seeing and avoiding other aircraft while operating in visual meteorological conditions. It also presents unique challenges in terms of maintaining the electronic connectivity essential to the safe operation and seamless integration of sUAS into the NAS. The hazard analysis included in this assessment reflects the implications of these attributes”.
The following hazards listed in order of greatest risk to the NAS are included in this assessment:
• Fly-away protection failure
• Loss of control
• Lost visual contact with UA
• Pilot/observer error
• Loss of voice communication with ATC
• Loss of voice communication (pilot/observer)
Thru hazard analysis, operators can potentially identify hazards associated with a particular phase or stage of the operation. A typical system safety task for hazard identification involves the preparation of a preliminary hazard list (PHL). This is accomplished by reviewing lessons learned, accident reports, and other historical data (Stephans, 2012). Having identified potential hazards, a subjective evaluation regarding probability, severity and exposure to those hazards is performed. The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the level of risk associated with the hazards; if it is deemed acceptable, if it can be eliminated, reduced or if the operation needs to be cancelled altogether. A robust risk management program (RMP) consists of three major parts: a hazard assessment, a prevention program and an emergency response program (Stephans, 2012).
For the benefit of this research paper, the AeroVironment Raven RQ-11B sUAS will be analyzed to identify potential hazards associated with a particular phase of its operation(s).
Raven
The Raven is the most widely used sUAS in the world. It can be hand launched and is controlled by a ground based operator either manually or preprogrammed for autonomous operation using advanced avionics and GPS navigation.
Preliminary Hazard list
The Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) is developed by individuals most familiar with the sUAS operation and a particular stage or phase of that operation. By brainstorming possible safety concerns associated with a stage or phase of operation, the PHL is created. The PHL tool (Fig.1) is instrumental in evaluating any one of the specific stages in the RAVENs operations (e.g. planning, staging, launching, flight and recovery). Once the hazards have been listed a determination as to the probability and severity of the hazards must be performed.
Probability/Severity
Probability is classified as frequent, probable, occasional, remote, or improbable. Severity is categorized as catastrophic, critical, marginal, or negligible (Barnhart, 2011). Once the hazards have been classified an initial risk level (RL) must be identified. Assessed risks are expressed as a Risk Assessment Code (RAC) which is a combination of one severity category and one probability level. For instance, if we determined that launching the RAVEN from a field that has trees nearby then a probability of impacting a tree would be classified as Probable and be rated a probability level “B” (reference Fig. 1) and the severity category described as Marginal would be rated a “3” (reference Fig. 2).

Figure 1-Probability matrix adapted from MIL-STD-882E
Department of Defense Standard Practice System Safety


Figure 2-Severity matrix adapted from MIL-STD-882E
Department of Defense Standard Practice System Safety


Risk Assessment Code
Assessed risks are expressed as a Risk Assessment Code (RAC) which is a combination of one severity category and one probability level. In our example our RAC is expressed as “3B”. Therefore, when used in conjunction with the risk assessment matrix (RAM) (Fig.3) found in MIL-STd-882E a risk level of Serious is determined.

Figure 3-Risk assessment matrix adapted from MIL-STD-882E
Department of Defense Standard Practice System Safety

Preliminary Hazard Analysis
The preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), allows us to determine ways to mitigate the previously identified hazards and initial risks. As depicted in Figure 4 a Raven staging and launch process is broken down into identified hazards, its probability of occurrence, the severity of risk, and mitigating actions. Using the RAC/RAM previously expressed of 3B/Serious we can determine that the Mitigation Action for Item S-3 is; “ensure clear launch flight path; issue launch warning.” And thereby the Resultant Risk Level (RRL) is classified as Medium downgraded from serious.

Figure 4-Preliminary Hazard List/Analysis adapted from EWOB dated July 16, 2014

Operational Hazard Review and Analysis
The Operational Hazards Review and Analysis tool (Fig. 5) is used to identify and evaluate hazards throughout the entire process or operations. The OHR&A is essential to ongoing hazards evaluation and provides the necessary feedback to assess the effectiveness of mitigating actions. Similar in form to the PHL/A, the different column in an OHR&A is the Action Review column which lists the mitigating actions identified in the PHL/A and determines if they were satisfactory (Barnhart, 2011).

Figure 5 Operational Hazards Review and Analysis retrieved from EWOB dated July 16, 2014

Operational Risk Management
Risk management activities are designed to assist the project manager and team members in understanding previously identified risks, the probability and consequences of failure and to identify and implement appropriate mitigations. As can be seen in Figure 6, Subtask 2 Implementation mitigations and those directly responsible for management of the activity are identified.

Figure 6-Organizational Risk Management Worksheet Retrieved from EWOB dated July 16, 2014.

References
AV-AeroVironment (2012, October). AeroVironment’s Puma All Environment (Ae) small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS), Puma AE White Paper, presented at the initial project safety review FAA/LA-ACO, Lakewood, CA.
Barnhart, Richard K., Shappee, Eric, and Marshall, Douglas M. Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London, GBR: CRC Press, 2011. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 1 December 2015.
EWOB (2014) Managing Risks in sUAS Operations retrieved from http://lewob.blogspot.com/2014/07/managing-risks-in-suas-operations.html
Gramp, D.E. (2010) Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Safety Risk Management Assessment Retrieved from https://avssp.faa.gov/avs/afs80/afs-86/Shared%20Documents/Small%20Unmanned%20Aircraft%20System%20(sUAS)%20Notice%20of%20Proposed%20Rule%20Making%20Safety%20Risk%20Management%20Assessment.pdf

Tuesday, November 24, 2015

6.6 A COMPARISON OF AUTOMATED TAKEOFF AND LANDING SYSTEMS

Running head: A COMPARISON OF AUTOMATED TAKEOFF AND LANDING SYSTEMS 1
A Comparison of Automated Takeoff and Landing Systems Among
Manned and Unmanned Aircraft

Robert J. Winn
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-WW-ASCI638


Abstract
Since the beginning of aviation, man has continued to develop and improve automated aircraft systems intended to reduce the liveware workload associated with conducting all phases of flight operations. With the increased proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operating in excess of 24 hours and the capabilities of transport aircraft to engage in long-duration flight operations the necessity to reduce the workload of UAS operating crews has become more prevalent. This paper will analyze an automated system that is in use by both manned and unmanned flight operations during critical phases of flight. The automated system will be described as it relates to both operations and the capabilities and limitations of the system will be presented as well as its overall effects on safe operations. In closing, recommendations regarding the level of automation for future variants of the system will be presented.
Keywords, automation level, liveware, operations, safety, workload, NextGen

A Comparison of Automated Takeoff and Landing Systems Among
Manned and Unmanned Aircraft
The Federal Aviation Administration’s NextGen system was developed to modernize how the National Airspace System (NAS) is utilized. In order to allow more aircraft to operate within closer proximity to one another the aviation industry must implement automation which controls takeoff, landing and even ground taxi.
However, these automation systems are complex, and still require human inputs, even if just for programming. Contrary to their intention, this can actually increase pilot and controller workload as systems must be learned, programmed and monitored at all times for both manned and unmanned aircraft (Cooke, Pringle, & Pedersen, 2007)
This paper will provide a basic description of one of these systems and identify two platforms with which it is used. Capabilities and limitations of the system will be presented, as well as its effects Operational Safety and any possible recommendations for future enhancements.
Automated Takeoff and Landing Systems (ATLS)
Recent advancements in technology have allowed the NAS to be accessed by both manned and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Automated takeoff and landing systems or ATLS reduces the workload of the Air traffic Controller and of the flight crew during the most critical phases of operations; takeoff, landing and ground taxi. Two distinctly different operating platforms incorporate ATLS to reduce the flight crew’s workload during these most critical phases of flight, these platforms are the UAS Northrop Grumman Global Hawk and the manned air transport Boeing 777.
Global Hawk
The Global Hawk is a long endurance UAS capable of 32 hours of operation. The flight crews are invariably assigned to rotating shifts in order to accommodate these long flight hours and are most likely subjected to fatigue issues brought about by interruptions to their natural circadian rhythms. In an attempt to minimize the workload of the flight crews during the phases of fatigue, the Global Hawk is configured with satellite and line of site (LOS) data link control capability via the ground control station (GCS). The satellite link provides critical Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation data to the Global Hawk. Combined with a synthetic aperture radar moving target indicator (SAR/MTI) a high resolution electro-optical (EO) digital camera and a third-generation infrared (IR) sensor, all operating through a common signal processor making it capable of fully autonomous takeoff, flight and landing (Northrup Grumman , 2012).
This critical flight navigation data is used by the Mission Control Element (MCE) via the GCS and enables the flight crew to monitor all sensors, perform mission planning and if necessary change the autonomous flight operation using manual inputs and control. For the ground portions of its flight missions, including autonomous takeoff, landing and taxi operations the Launch and Recovery unit Element, or LRE, is used. This is primarily accomplished with its Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) and with its LOS connectivity and operation capabilities (Northrup Grumman , 2012).
By means of this autonomous system the Global Hawk is the epitome of long-endurance flight operations, still capable of liveware intervention. 
Boeing 777
The Boeing 777 autonomous flight capabilities are in many ways similar to those of the Global Hawk and other UAV systems. The 777 is capable of autonomous takeoff, landing and flight, all with minimum pre-programming and inputs from flight crews (Boeing, 2014). In some aspects the infrastructure required for autonomous flight control of the 777 is not the same as that of the Global Hawk. Instead of a satellite and LOS command and control by means of the GCS the 777 takes advantage of its onboard flight crew and two primary autonomous systems; the Airplane Information Management System (AIMS) and the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB). By means of onboard sensors which provide critical system feedback of inflight controls and communication with ATC, the AIMS is capable of managing approach and departure procedures. The EFB minimizes crew workload for the majority of normal flight operations by automating checklists, flight plans and ATC approach information. By means of the EFB during the non-critical phase of operations the crew is less likely to have been subjected to workload fatigue and can focus more on the autonomous attributes of the ALTS during a flight critical phase.
Capabilities
By use of imploring autonomous control during critical phases of flight it removes the capabilities of error thru the liveware/hardware interface attributed to fatigue due to workload saturation.
Limitations
In any form, automation affects situational awareness by changing the operator’s role from actively controlling the system to passively monitoring the system (Endsley, 1996). When workload is reduced so is the operator’s situational awareness of the given task. To further compound task shredding via automation, should the automated task fail, the operator is less likely to successfully take control as the task has not been practiced and a complete understanding of the failure mode is unknown.
Without human input and intervention, the automated systems have no self-preservation motivations and can literally fly themselves into the ground, or follow unsafe inputs, simply because there is no reasoning of “this doesn't look right,” when an incorrect input or event is occurring in autonomous flight (Brown, 2015)
Operational Safety
The 777 ATLS are probably more likely to incur manual override than the Global Hawks as the crewmembers are one with the aircraft, not in a GCS, providing them with increased situational awareness. On the other hand, the Global Hawk pilot must rely on feedback from the UAV’s infrastructure to determine if there’s a problem that requires manual override. Using a fully autonomous system is designed to remove incorrect human pilot input errors that could cause unsafe flight conditions. However, as is illustrated in numerous manned and unmanned NTSB accident reports when autonomous systems were engaged, that is not entirely possible due to the human inputs necessary to program and design the autonomous software for flight ops in both manned and UAS systems (Cooke, Pringle, & Pedersen, 2007). Let’s not forget the adage, “A computer is only as smart as the operator”.
Training
Despite the incredible amount of automated flight capability in both unmanned and manned aircraft today, there is still a need for human insight and oversight to protect the machinery from itself when given faulty software or human inputs (Brown, 2015). To meet these challenges and to trust the capabilities the automated systems provide, those critical phases of flight must be part of simulator training so that the crews can recognize when automation is in error or has failed, allowing for manual control of the situation.
Level of Automation
Issues such as unbalanced workload, loss of SA, and skill loss can be addressed successfully by implementing Adaptive Automation (AA). Adaptive Automation is characterized by the ability to turn itself on in connection with a system or an operator event (Barnhart, 2011).
Current autonomous systems operate at a Level of Autonomy 1-3 (Low LoA) where the liveware (human) interface is the main component. As autonomous systems become more accepted by the liveware interface (operator) and user (passenger) these autonomous systems will progress in the near future to a level 7-9 (High LoA). At this level the system has very little interface with the liveware and no longer needs approval to execute its assigned operation/goal. The system will inform the human of its intent and will proceed unless there is human intervention.
Recommendation for Future Enhancements
Whereas AA is dynamic and flexible, traditional automation is static; total automation or autonomy is neither. At Beyond Level 10, autonomy or full automation proposes a strong artificial intelligence (AI) approach to automation. Humans have the unique ability to perform abstract judgment and reasoning tasks in undefined or ill-defined circumstances. So, it is unclear whether systems at a LoA 10 can be considered to be of human-level intelligence (Barnhart, 2011).

References
Barnhart, Richard K., Shappee, Eric, and Marshall, Douglas M.. Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London, GBR: CRC Press, 2011. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 24 November 2015.
Brown, J. (2015) Automated Takeoff and Landing Systems in Manned and Unmanned Aircraft, Retrieved from http://www.droningonandon.com/blog/automated-takeoff-and-landing-systems-in-manned-and-unmanned-aircraft
Cooke, N., Pringle, H., & Pedersen, H. (2007). Human Factors of Remotely Operated Vehicles (Vol. 7). JAI Press.
Endsley, M. 1996. Automation and situation awareness, In Automation and Human Performance: Theory and Applications, ed. R. Parasuraman and M. Mouloua, 163– 181. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Northrup Grumman . (2012, April ). Capabilities . Retrieved January 31, 2015, from http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/RQ4Block10GlobalHawk/Documents/GHMD-New-Brochure.pdf
Orlady, H.W., Orlady, L.M. (2012) Automation, Human factors in multi-crew flight operations (pg. 239) Location: Ashgate

Friday, November 20, 2015

5.4 AN ANALYSIS OF SHIFT SCHEDULE ROTATIONS

Running head: AN ANALYSIS OF SHIFT SCHEDULE ROTATIONS…………...……………1
An Analysis of Shift Schedule Rotations to allow for 24/7 UAS Operations
Conducted by 4 Teams
Robert J. Winn
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-WW-ASCI 638

Abstract
This research paper will present an analysis of a shift schedule for a MQ-1B Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) UAS squadron of the United States Air Force (USAF). The schedule, based on a 6 days on, 2 days off rotational format in order to accommodate missions conducted 24/7, 365 days a year providing armed, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to forces operating in country. In order to accomplish this mission, the UAS crews were divided into 4 teams and assigned a shift work schedule of 6 days on, 2 days off. Under this shift schedule crew members have reported extreme fatigue while conducting operations due to a lack of quality sleep. In order to optimize operations a revised shift schedule will be introduced in order to address the fatigue issue reported by the crews. In conclusion, an analysis of the current schedule will address the pros and cons compared to the revised shift schedule.
Keywords: fatigue, inadequate sleep, optimized operations, shift schedule,

An Analysis of Shift Schedule Rotations to allow for 24/7 UAS Operations
Conducted by 4 Teams
The introduction of long-endurance unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), such as the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper, has necessitated the routine implementation of shift work for United States Air Force (USAF) UAS crewmembers in order to provide the necessary around-the-clock staffing of ground control stations (Tvaryanas, 2008). A current 4 team shift schedule to accommodate 24/7, 365 days a year operations by MQ-1B USAF crews has introduced reports of increased fatigue attributed to inadequate sleep. The 2 cycle shift schedule requires 4 crews to alternate between 12 hour day (1st cycle) and night (2nd cycle) shifts by working 6 days on then two days off and then rotating to the alternate 12 cycle for the next 6/2 rotation.
A study by Barnes & Matz in 1998, found Army UAS operators preferred longer over shorter rotations because they perceived the longer rotations allowed for better situational awareness of the tactical environment (Tvaryanas, 2006). It could be that the longer rotation preferred by the crews was to that of the shift duration (12 hours) and not to the cycle of six days on. Another study showed that shift-working crewmembers in a Predator UAS squadron had significantly increased fatigue, emotional exhaustion, and burnout relative to traditional aircrew from another “high-demand, low-density” weapon system. The squadron work schedule was redesigned, but preferred shift work practices were not fully implemented because of manpower constraints and crewmember preferences (Tvaryanas, 2008).
Fatigue/Stress
Fatigue is a “State of diminished Physical or mental efficiency”. Fatigue can be triggered by previous perceived stress which may lead to impairment of performance and function (Kocalevent, 2011). The state of being fatigued has an effect on an individual’s capability to handle given levels of stress. The major causes of fatigue are; Sleep Loss, Work Schedule, Circadian Rhythm Disruptions, Recreational or Extracurricular Activity
Stress is a complex phenomenon brought about by the pressures that life or a given situation present. Factors that affect stress are Individual, Environmental and Occupational. The inability to socialize with family and community can exacerbate individual stressors, those stressors can compound issues attributed to increased fatigue brought about by diminished physical or mental efficiency. How an individual handles stress can have a direct effect on the individual’s ability to decompress, get restful sleep and recharge both the physical and mental state of being.
8 vs. 12
Numerous studies have concluded that for each hour past an 8 hour shift the risk and potential for error increased by one. These errors were also more likely to occur during a night shift where disruption of natural circadian rhythm occurs. In order to minimize the overall risk on a shift system we need to consider the number of successive night shifts, the length of the night shifts and the pro-vision of breaks within them (Tvaryanas, 2008). Additional studies found that a 12 hr. night shift that included frequent rest breaks might well prove safer than a shorter 8 hr. night shift with only a single, mid-shift break. Likewise, the length of the night shifts and the number of successive night shifts involved in a shift system will act in combination to determine the overall risk on that system (Folkard, 2003).
Work Cycle Duration
Shift worker fatigue has been described as a function of shift timing, length, frequency, and regularity as well as intrashift and intershift recovery opportunities (Tvaryanas, 2008). Shift workers experience a wide range of problems from acute disturbances of circadian rhythms and sleep to diminished family and social lives (Tvaryanas, 2008). If the number of successive night shifts is directly attributed to errors brought about by fatigue and circadian rhythm disruptions, than it would stand to reason the current 6 day on -2 day off cycle is not the optimal schedule for ensuring safe UAS operations. Therefore a revised shift schedule to accommodate the 4 UAS teams has been developed.
2-2/3-2/2-3 Rotating Shift Schedule | 24/7 Shift Coverage
The length of the night shifts and the number of successive night shifts involved in a shift system will act in combination to determine the overall risk on that system (Folkard, 2003). Implementing a 2-2/3-2/2-3 rotating shift schedule using 4 teams (crews) and 2 twelve-hour shifts to provide 24/7 coverage provides the individual crews with less exposure to prolonged 12 hour night shift rotations (Figure 1). Implemented over a 4-week cycle each team works 2 consecutive day shifts, followed by 2 days off, returning to work for 3 consecutive day shifts, followed by another 2 days off, then returning for another 2 consecutive day shifts, followed by 3 days off duty. The cycle then repeats itself but the crews are then assigned to the night shift for the same 2-2/3-2/2-3 cycle.


Figure 1. 2-2/3-2/2-3 rotating shift schedule Retrieved from http://www.bmscentral.com/learn-employee-scheduling/2-2-3-2-2-3-rotating-shift/
It should be considered that although the shift durations are in 12 hour increments a minimum of 15 minutes of overlap would be added by the outgoing dayshift crew in order to provide for a positive hand-off to the gaining night shift crew.
Pros • No employee works more than three consecutive days
• 3-day weekend every other weekend
• Taking 2 vacation days on one of the 2-day work week gives 7 days off
Cons • Could work up to 62 hours in one week
• Long shift length (12 hours)
• Requires an average of 2 overtime hours per employee per week
(BMS, 2015)
Conclusion
M.J Thorpy presented in the Journal of Family Practice, (V59, No.1, 2010), that there was a marked increase in the risk for incidents during working hours suggests that working more than 4 consecutive 12-hour night shifts should be avoided. Therefore, shift crews should be made aware that a potential exists for increased errors towards the end of a 12 hour shift. Shift schedules should rotate clockwise rather than counterclockwise manner as it has been found easier to change the sleep/wake cycle to a clockwise shift rotation, as this follows the natural adaptive pattern of delaying the sleep period. Additional ways to improve the sleep –wake cycle is to improve shift-work conditions, such as bright light exposure and appropriately timed naps.

Dr. D. Schroeder presented in a 2008 FAA Fatigue Management Symposium the following:
Summary
• No single shift rotation plan can entirely resolve the work and rest scheduling demands placed on individuals
• Discussion of specific advantages and risks difficult due to great diversity of flexible and irregular hours
• Given the variability of flexible hours, focus should be on the actual working hours of employees and the timing of their sleep
Recommendations
• Employ ergonomic principles of scheduling as possible
• Shift rotation time should be no less than 10 hrs

References
BMS, Business management Systems (2015), 2-2 3-2 2-3 Rotating Shift Schedule | 24/7 Shift Coverage Retrieved from http://www.bmscentral.com/learn-employee-scheduling/2-2-3-2-2-3-rotating-shift/
Kocalevent, R. D., Hinz, A., Brahler, E., Klapp, B. F., (2011) Determinants of fatigue and stress Research article from BMC Research notes 2011, 4:238 Retrieved from http://www.biomedcentral.com/1756-0500/4/238
Folkard, S., Tucker, P.T., (2003) Shift Work, Safety and productivity Retrieved from Department of Psychology, Swansea University, Swansea, Wales, United Kingdom Occupational Medicine (Impact Factor: 1.03). 04/2003; 53(2):95-101. DOI: 10.1093/occmed/kqg047
Schroeder, D. Ph.D., (2008) Sleep/Wake Cycles and Performance of ATC Operators Presented at the FAA Fatigue Management Symposium, June 17-19, 2008 Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/afs/afs200/media/aviation_fatigue_symposium/SchroederAppComplete.pdf
Thorpy, M.J., (2010) Managing the patient with shift-work disorder, Supplement to the Journal of Family Practice, Vol 59, No 1., January 2010, Retrieved from http://media.mycme.com/documents/29/culpepper_2010_swd_suppl_7021.pdf
Tvaryanas, A.P., Lopez, N., Hickey, P., Daluz, C., Thompson, W. T., Caldwell, J.L. (2006) Effects of Shift Work and Sustained Operations: Operator Performance in Remotely Piloted Aircraft (OP-REPAIR) Retrieved from http://www.wpafb.af.mil/shared/media/document/afd-090121-043.pdf
Tvaryanas, A.P., Platte, W., Swigart, C., Colebank, J., Miller, N.L., (2008) A Resurvey of Shift Work-Related Fatigue in MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aircraft System Crewmembers Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA477976

4.6 INSITU SCANEAGLE-ESTABLISHING A PATH


Running head: INSITU SCANEAGLE-ESTABLISHING A PATH

Insitu ScanEagle-Establishing a path for UAS to operate Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS)
Robert J. Winn
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-WW-ASCI638

Abstract
This paper presents the attributes of the Insitu ScanEagle and how this unmanned aerial system (UAS) is equipped to conduct operations beyond line of sight (BLOS) of the operator. It will present the needed infrastructure to support the flight operations and identify the necessary support equipment, what additional personnel are required, their roles and what procedures are in place to ensure the UAS operates safely in the National Airspace System (NAS). A comparison between BLOS and line of sight (LOS) operations will be discussed to show the advantages and disadvantages of each of these methods and what unique human factors are associated with switching between each method of operation. In closing, the paper will identify a current operation or Pathfinder currently in the test phase, through joint participation with industry and the FAA that encourages the private use of a UAS while operating under BLOS capabilities.
Keywords: BLOS, support equipment, human factors, pathfinder, personnel, procedures

Insitu ScanEagle-Establishing a Path for UAS to Operate

Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS)
The Insitu ScanEagle, classified as a small unmanned aircraft system or sUAS has a max takeoff weight of <55 lbs. and is capable of operating beyond line of sight (BLOS). Due to its small environmental foot print the ScanEagle is nearly undetectable and can remain airborne for more than 24 hours with a service ceiling of 15,000 feet. Comprised of a video datalink in both analog and digitally encrypted feed and a Command and Control or C2 datalink that is both encrypted and non-encrypted its capable of delivering live video feeds allowing the operator to stay one step ahead of any situation. Infrastructure The System is comprised of four primary elements, 1) the UA 2) the Mark 4 ground launcher (trailer mounted, pneumatically actuated, expeditionary 3) Ground Control Station or GCS (point and click command enabling semiautonomous real time control) 4) SkyHook (runway independent cable recovery system, requires no nets) and 5) Operating Crew (by type certification consists of (1) Pilot and (1) ground crew member (aids in the launch and recovery operations). In addition to the primary system elements, the necessary support equipment to enable BLOS operations is the GPS satellite relay, the satellite data link and the satellite uplink vehicle. Not normally addressed as support equipment or part of the system, but an aspect of crew resource management (CRM) is the coordination/communication with Air Traffic Controllers that provide essential operator feedback regarding manned air operations or other obstacles within the vicinity of the UA, so that predetermined mitigations can be enacted upon. Line of Sight
Line of Sight (LOS) operations refers to the ability to provide command and control of the UA via direct up-link /down-link between the GCS and the UA. Operating under LOS offers advantages over BLOS by minimizing the infrastructure, such as satellite relay/data link support equipment, needed to perform C2 of the UA. However a disadvantage to operating under LOS is that the extended range capabilities of the UA are restricted, i.e. the UA cannot travel out of direct signal reception of the GCS uplink antennas or C2 and data downlink is affected.
Beyond Line of Sight
Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) operations refer to UAS operations via a satellite link (GPS) that reaches “over the horizon”. This allows the operator to control the UA from considerably longer distances where a ground based-direct line of sight (LOS) datalink may be hindered by extending beyond the horizon or behind obstacles, such as mountains. A clear disadvantage is the additional infrastructure required to provide BLOS capability (e.g. Satellite relay, Satellite data link and the Satellite uplink vehicle).
Crew Resource Management-CRM
As stated in an ERAU-ASCI 638 presentation (2013), “Typically there is a delay of approximately 2 seconds from operator input to the controls to execution of commands by the aircraft; this makes takeoff and landing procedures difficult if not impossible due to the need to rapidly respond to changes during critical phases of flight. To work around this problem, there is usually a separate Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) crew and Mission Crew Element (MCE) that work together to accomplish the entire flight. Good CRM between these two elements is crucial to safe operations and involves many human factors issues that can cause problems if not executed properly. Precise coordination, timing, communication, and duplicated settings in the GCS are critical because a breakdown of any one of these factors can cause an accident or incident. Common procedures, checklists and training are essential components of successful BLOS operations.” To enhance CRM between the pilot (MCE) and ground crew (LRE) Insitu implemented robust GCS software referred to as I-MUSE.
I-MUSE
I-MUSE (Insitu Multiple UAS Software Environment): provides the interface between the pilot and the ScanEagle aircraft. The software capabilities directly enhance the pilot’s ability to multitask operational requirements. I-MUSE functionality includes: plan flights; launch aircraft; operate the aircraft in flight; monitor the aircraft and the data collection; and recover the aircraft. I-MUSE is factory-installed on all GCS and provides the pilot with situational awareness information via visual displays of terrain, obstacles, altitudes, etc. (similar to a manned aircraft flight deck). It also provides multiple checklists to perform pre-flight; post-flight; and emergency tasks. Finally, since I-MUSE is the mission planning interface, the pilot may load maps, elevation information, satellite imagery, etc., to assist with mission planning. Overlays are permitted in I-MUSE to alert the pilot of no fly zones and air traffic corridors (Murray, 2013).
Pathfinder
In collaboration with the Federal Aviation Administration, while conducting operations in New Mexico, Insitu (a Boeing subsidiary) launched the first sUAS to perform commercial BLOS operations within the continental United States (Insitu, 2015). This particular Pathfinder will provide necessary data to show the abilities of BLOS operations while the ScanEagle performs video inspections and analysis of predetermined sections of the BNSF railway.

References
Insitu, Inc. (2015) Insitu Unmanned Aircraft Conducts Railway Monitoring, Historic First Flight with BNSF Railway, Retrieved from http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/insitu-unmanned-aircraft-conducts-railway-monitoring-historic-first-flight-with-bnsf-railway-300167570.html
Murray, T., Eastwick, J., Evans, C. (2013) White Paper: System Safety Assessment for ScanEagle Type Certificate with limitations (Restricted Category) Date: May 17, 2013 Rev. 0.0
















3.5 Research: UAS Integration in the NAS
Robert J Winn
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-WW-ASCI638
The FAA is developing a project called the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). What are the goals of NextGen, and how does it seek to improve future aviation operations in the NAS?
By changing from a ground-based radar system to satellite based GPS system, NextGen hopes to improve air commerce in the NAS by providing direct routes to destinations (saving time and operating costs), by reducing traffic delays, by increasing capacity and to allow air traffic controllers greater flexibility in managing aircraft operations with increased safety.
Where UAS/NAS integration is concerned, the ultimate goal is to enable a responsive, efficient, timely, coordinated multiagency research and development (R&D) effort that will enable the U.S. to realize fully the benefits of UAS operations in the NAS (Next, 2012).
To ensure this goal is realized a NextGen Unmanned Aircraft Systems Research, Development and Demonstration Roadmap was created. The development and demonstration objectives are intended to address the sense-and-avoid capability for UAS operating in any given density within the NAS. The Roadmap also takes into consideration that “achieving safe UAS integration depends on a complex set of regulatory, technical, economic, and political factors that must be addressed in an integrated and systematic fashion” (Next, 2012).
How do UAS fit into this vision for the future keeping in mind the research you have done on Detect, Sense, and Avoid requirements, and Lost Link scenarios?
In order for UAS to safely integrate the NAS, they will require advanced autonomous technology and standards to avoid other traffic and must mitigate the safety concern regarding loss of communications within the HMI.
Since UAS are unmanned, they have no capability to perform see and avoid mitigations currently required of manned operations. Therefore, some yet to be approved sensory equipment, radar, or operations under visual line of sight (VLOS) must be implemented for this regulatory requirement. The Government Accountability Office (GAO), reported in 2008 that “no technology had been identified as a suitable substitute for a person on board the aircraft in seeing and avoiding other aircraft. Additionally, UASs’ communications and control links are vulnerable to unintentional or intentional radio interference that can lead to loss of control of an aircraft and an accident.”
By 2020, manned aircraft will be required to incorporate continuously improved technologies such as Automated Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) in order to comply with NextGen expectations. As the “payload-envelope” of this technology is reduced and its operating capabilities enhanced, it will contribute significantly to the ability of all manned and unmanned operations in the NAS.
What human factors issues or challenges do you foresee with the implementation of NextGen and the integration of UAS?
Loss-of Link (LOL) during UAS operation in the NAS is probably the most critical factor in the human –machine interface (HMI). Should LOL occur while the UAS is in flight the operator has no ability to implement an evasive maneuver should another aircraft enter into the operating vicinity of the UAS. A study conducted on behalf of ERAU students specifically focused the HMI of UASs and the vulnerabilities of a LOL scenario. The results conveyed four functional goals including: pre-mission building and entering the emergency return profile, updating the lost link profile, detecting lost link and responding to lost link (Kaste, 2012).
References
GAO-08-511, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Federal Actions needed to Ensure safety and Expand Their Potential Uses within the National Airspace System, Published: May 15, 2008 Publicly released May 15, 2008 retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-511
Kaste, K.; Archer, J.; Neville, K.; Blickensderfer, B.; Luxion, S., "An analysis of FAA certification regulations and guidelines for evaluating the unmanned aircraft human-machine interface: Lost link," in Systems and Information Design Symposium (SIEDS), 2012 IEEE , vol., no., pp.150-155, 27-27 April 2012
doi: 10.1109/SIEDS.2012.6215149
Next Generation Air Transportation System, NextGen UAS Research, Development and Demonstration Roadmap Version 1.0, March 15, 2012 retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas-nextgen.pdf

Sunday, December 22, 2013

Certification of UAS for Commercial Operation

Week 9 has finally arrived for ERAU- ASCI 530 UAS studies. During this time frame I was tasked to prepare and submit an analysis demonstrating my understanding of the course topics associated with UAS design, operations, or regulation. Since I work with the FAA I chose to focus my analysis on the regulatory aspects of UAS certification. My primary focus was that of how current UAS manufacturers do not have an FAA approved quality system and how they have misinterpreted the different quality aspects in industry as being acceptable standards in allowing commercial operation of their systems in the NAS. For those that read this paper I hope that it answers some basic regulatory questions with regards to certification requirements for UASs and find that my recommendation in lieu of non-published FAA guidance is a viable option in accepting systems produced pre/post non FAA approved quality system. I would like to add that I have learned much and look forward to continuing my MAS/UAS education as time permits.

Abstract
Current unmanned aerial systems (UASs) are built to satisfy customer requirements, most not all, are built to military specifications. However, none of these UASs are manufactured by or under an approved quality system, with approved parts or processes. The manufacturers rely on parts and materials that are often referred to as commercial off the shelf parts (COTS). COTS parts have not yet proven to have a level of airworthiness (i.e., safety) to allow for commercial operation of UAS within the National Airspace System (NAS). Currently, Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) have not yet been established to address this critical issue. The intent of this paper is to show how the implementation of FARs will assure the airworthiness of UAS for commercial use in the NAS.

Summary
In November of 2012, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (Final, 2012).Within the Reform Act, Sect 332. Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) into National Airspace System (NAS), addressed specific aspects regarding certification issues regarding UAS stating, “Providing airworthiness approval for sUAS will require careful analysis and consideration of which certification rules may be used to expeditiously approve the vehicles. We will review the current processes that have been used or are currently in use to approve sUAS” (Final, 2012, p. 5). However, since there are currently no regulations that specifically address the type –certification approvals of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)s or their supporting systems, it was clear that the special evaluation teams of the FAA would have to call upon their knowledge and skills to develop hybrid approvals scaled to UAS needs which could allow limited commercial operations (Final, 2012).
The absence of standards, regulations and procedures to govern the safe integration of civil-use for UAS into civilian air space are key factors limiting growth in the non-military UAS sector (Chesebro, 2011). In the short-term, existing military UAS manufacturers likely will dominate civil-use UAS markets if they are able to leverage their capabilities and technologies in the adaptation of existing platforms or development of new systems for civil purposes (Chesebro, 2011). Meanwhile operation of small civil UAS in the USA is as a model aircraft (Austin, 2010).
Key to any domination of market access and sustainability is having an understanding of that market. Recently, it was noted by an FAA program office, during type certification of two UAS projects, that both applicants lacked a clear understanding of the certification requirements necessary for type-certification of UAS for commercial purposes in the NAS. This misunderstanding was due in part to the applicants (manufacturers) impression that because they had an operating platform approved/accepted by the military, it must clearly meet the requirements of the FAA. Clearly neither applicant had an understanding of the requirements needed for the market, operating commercial UAS in the NAS. Since there are no clear UAS Federal Aviation Regulations currently defined, this case analysis will address those that are in place for manned aircraft. It is from these proven safety rules that UAS guidance will be derived.

Issue Statement
Current unmanned aerial systems are designed and built to satisfy customer requirements, most not all, are built to some international standard or military specification. In 2001, a report was generated by the FAA that specifically addressed aspects of commercially off the shelf (COTS) parts in airborne software. The intent of the report was to provide findings about the state of the industry relative to the design objectives identified in guidance document DO-254 and to focus on the implications for the use of COTS electronic hardware components in safety critical airborne systems (Thornton, 2011). The report addressed how the use of complex electronic hardware components in airborne systems poses a challenge to the meeting of safety requirements because, for complex components, complete verification is, at best, very difficult and, at worst, not achievable (Thornton, 2011).
And yet, these manufacturers rely on parts and materials that are often referred to as COTS parts. However, none of these UASs are currently manufactured by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved facility, to an approved type design with an FAA approved quality system, rarely using approved parts or processes. It should be noted that a primary responsibility of the FAA is to ensure the safe design and operation of the system(s) are established prior to issuance of the Certificate of Airworthiness (Austin, 2010).

Significance of Issue
UAS come in a variety of shapes and sizes and serve diverse purposes (Dorr, 2013). Whether it be their military use in the dull, dirty and dangerous applications of reconnaissance, surveillance and the technologically improved realization of weapons delivery, to that of the civilian/commercial roles that were discussed in R. Austin (2010) Unmanned Aircraft Systems UAVS Design, Development and Deployment such as aerial photography, agricultural applications, ranching, monitoring of coastlines, customs, conservation, and used by public service and power companies the list of applications continues to grow. Regardless of size, the responsibility to fly safely applies equally to manned and unmanned aircraft operations (Dorr, 2013). Equally the responsibility for manufacturers to establish processes and procedures must be in place to prevent injury to persons, animals, and damage to property due to failures of the UASs and also to prevent injury or damage caused by collisions between UAV and other airborne vehicles in the NAS (Austin, 2010).
In 2013, the FAA published their UAS Roadmap, wherein they proclaim their proven certification process for aircraft that includes establishing special conditions when new and unique technologies are involved (First, 2013). Also further establishing, in those parts of the NAS that have demanding communications, navigation, and surveillance performance requirements, successful demonstration of UAS to meet these certification criteria will be necessary (First, 2013). It should be understood however, that those demands for UAV operating within the NAS are primarily for these systems operating within the vicinity of other vehicles and have yet to be defined for those smaller or small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) operating within Class G airspace. This low-lying airspace does not require communications with air traffic control and is of little concern to larger aircraft, thus, there are few regulations that apply to craft in this airspace.
These sUAS will undoubtedly find a niche in civil operations within this segment of the NAS. Unlike the manned aircraft industry, the UAS community does not have a set of standardized design specifications for basic UAS design that ensures safe and reliable operation in typical civilian service applications (First, 2013). This can also be interpreted to say that currently the UAS community has not been regulated in certification for commercial (civil) operation in the NAS.

sUAS
“Except for some special cases, such as small UAS (sUAS) with very limited operational range, all UAS will require design and airworthiness certification to fly civil operations in the NAS” (First, 2013, pg. 13). A case can be made that sUAS will not be regarded in the same light as that of the larger UAS that require more robust systems and operate using full-on navigation, communication, ground control stations (GCSs), launch & recovery systems, support equipment/personnel and transportation as required. This analysis being made, sUAS operating within the Class G airspace may very well be operating within line-of-sight (LOS) capabilities only. By comparison, the system configuration of larger UAS may provide capabilities for beyond-LOS or BLOS. The certification of which would require written guidance and regulatory oversight equal to that of manned aircraft today, but has yet to be fully developed and released. Without any clear UAS regulatory guidance for the FAA certification teams and the operator to refer to, it will require that both parties work together to ensure the safe design and operation of the system to issue the Certificate of Airworthiness for the complete system once it has been determined that the system meets its requirements for safety and is deemed airworthy (Austin, 2010). Manufacturers in the aviation industry not yet certified by the FAA rely on International quality systems recognized within the industry in hopes of having their product standout among competitors not having any quality rating(s) what so ever.

Quality Standards
Before the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) can be presented which define the requirements in establishing a manufacturing quality system some of the more prominent quality standards often misinterpreted as being acceptable in meeting FAA manufacturing regulatory requirements must first be reviewed.
ANSI
One of the more common standards used in manufacturing, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is a private non-profit organization that oversees the development of voluntary consensus standards for products, services, processes, systems, and personnel in the United States (Wiki, 2013). This organization ensures the overall specifications and operations of products are consistent, that people use the same definitions and terms, and that products are tested the same way (Wiki, 2013). ANSI also performs audits and subsequent accreditation of those found to be in conformance to standards – including globally-recognized cross-sector programs such as the ISO 9001 (quality) and AS 9100 management systems (ANSI, 2013).
COTS
“A commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) product is a software system that can be adapted to the needs of different customers without changing the source code of the system.” (Hashmi, 2012, pg.1). To expand the definition, COTS can be either software or hardware and consists of the following articles; Operating Systems, Databases, Graphics Packages, Busses, Processors, Disk Drives and Peripherals (Hashmi, 2012). To many sUAS manufacturers, a COTS product is a quick and cost effective answer in R&D parts procurement for their operating platform. Unfortunately, they are also under the impression that COTS parts are built to an acceptable quality standard. As previously discussed and to be outlined further, unless COTS parts are presented by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) as part of the original design package submitted for Type –Certification, and found to be airworthy, they do not fall under the FAA approved quality system for which the sUAS is manufactured and no quality controls for the manufacturer of the COTS have been established. However, in meeting the lowest bidder/quickest to develop requirements of everyday government bids the enticement to use COTS parts cannot be overlooked as they do provide the following benefits 1) as with other types of reuse, more rapid deployment of a reliable system may be possible 2) Other companies may already use the applications so experience of the systems is available. 3) Some development risks are avoided by using existing software 4) Businesses can focus on their core activity without having to devote a lot of resources to IT systems development 5) As operating platforms evolve, technology updates may be simplified as these are the responsibility of the COTS product vendor rather than the customer (Hashmi, 2012). Of course there are always problems associated with benefits attributed to shortcuts to design and development costs, some of the more significant issues might be 1) The COTS product may be based on assumptions that are practically impossible to change. The customer must therefore adapt their business to reflect these assumptions. 2) Choosing the right COTS system for an enterprise can be a difficult process, especially as many COTS products are not well documented. Making the wrong choice could be disastrous as it may be impossible to make the new system work as required. (It should be noted that this particular issue is primarily due to the COTS being manufactured in an uncontrolled quality environment, not something that a UAS manufacturer wants to have introduced into their system and have commercially flown in the NAS) 3) The COTS product vendor controls system support and evolution. They may go out of business, be taken over, or may make change that cause difficulties for customers (Hashmi, 2012). Bottom line, “If the vendor is unable to keep up with client problems, system bugs, or closes shop, the early savings can easily become an unexpected expense” (JSC, 2013).
Mil-Spec
What are military specifications (mil-spec)? Quite simply, they’re standards established for defining essential technical requirements of purchased materiel for the military or for substantially modified commercial items to be used by the military (MAC, 2013). These standards have been established to guarantee interoperability, commonality, reliability and cost of ownership to ease the strain on logistics systems, but they fail to meet the stringent standards set forth by the FAA in establishing that an article or product is indeed deemed airworthy (MAC, 2013). What mil-specs aren’t are a guarantee the product defined is the absolute best that it can be in terms of materials used or processes used for manufacturing (MAC, 2013). So why do we have Mil-Spec? To put it in context; for those UAS that have been accepted by the military or a civilian operator and certified to Mil-Spec standards it allows for the interchangeability of one UAV wing to be installed on another UAV system. But that doesn’t mean that it has gone thru the rigorous certification testing required of a type-certification program conducted under the auspice of an FAA approved quality system.
ISO 9001
“The ISO 9001 family addresses various aspects of quality management and contains some of ISO’s best known standards. The standards provide guidance and tools for companies and organizations who want to ensure that their products and services consistently meet customer’s requirements, and that quality is consistently improved” (ISO, n.d.). Within any quality system proper documentation is the key. For example, has the engineering department properly annotated the drawing title block to include company name, address, tolerances, notes, page, engineers by name, hierarchy and of course revision letter of the latest approved drawing applicable to the title block? How this is done is defined by the company’s internal quality processes and procedures, International Standardization of Organization (ISO) 9001 a documentation scheme is an accredited International Quality Management System (QMS) that provides written procedures for all aspects of the product development and manufacturing processes to include engineering documentation (Webb, 2001). Initial and renewal ISO 9001 accreditation is achieved by external audits performed annually, by qualified International examiners. Their primary focus is on the manufacturer’s quality system (Webb, 2001). A common quality slogan in industry is “Say what you do and do what you say.” In other words, document what you actually do, and then do what you wrote down (Webb, 2001). In situations where safety is an issue, such as reviewing quality systems where unmanned systems are manufactured, the manufacturer must remember that the auditor has been trained to go by the book (Webb, 2001). Given the unchartered territory with which the UAS may operate the manufacturer should count on it. Company and regulatory personnel together must identify and establish the safety-mark effort, but R&D, manufacturing, purchasing, distribution, quality control, and field service must all work as a team for the effort to be successful (Webb, 2001). The R&D group needs to design products, components or subassemblies whenever possible, far too often this group relies on those products already developed and classified as COTS parts. It is when COTS parts are used in the system that the component must be flagged and evaluated by compliance and agency personnel creating unknown variables in the continued airworthiness of the part (Webb, 2001). It has been shown that manufacturers that have a robust quality system in place save both time and money (Webb, 2001).
AS9100
AS9100 was developed in a supporting role to ISO 9001 by addressing the additional expectations of the aerospace industry (Barker, 2002). AS9100 requirements are established to be complementary to contractual and applicable law and regulations. Those implementing a quality system compliant with AS9100 must ensure that the additional requirements of their customers, regulatory agencies (such as the FAA and the JAA) and local, state and national laws are also referenced within the system’s documentation (Barker, 2002). The AS9100 standard includes extensive supplementation in design-and-development functions. Design outputs are supplemented to provide identification of key characteristics, and the data essential for the product that will be identified, manufactured, inspected, used and maintained is detailed.
Aspects of AS9100 and key components of Product Safety and Quality Control are clearly described by Barker (2002):
Manufacturing a product as sophisticated as an airplane or space vehicle requires special attention during the production processes. It’s important, for example, to ensure that the correct revision of the engineering documentation is being used and documented within the work instructions, and that work performance is recorded. Controlling production processes is essential to demonstrate that operations have been correctly performed. This is especially important when conducting special processes that don’t lend themselves to after-the-fact inspection techniques.
The industry frequently relies upon tooling and other production equipment, including computer-controlled machines, to fabricate and assemble products. This equipment often forms the basis for product acceptance. In these cases, it’s essential to demonstrate the integrity of these tools and machines and to develop a process that will ensure adequate oversight of the entire process.
Aircraft are designed to perform for 50 years or more, and properly maintaining the aircraft is essential for continued safe operation. Thus, servicing requirements are an important part of the total quality system. These include maintenance and repair manuals as well as the actual servicing work. Again, record-keeping is important in documenting the work performed, the equipment used and the people doing the work.
Some products require traceability of a part or all of their components. This requirement may be imposed by contract, regulatory agency or internal need. In any case, AS9100 provides the essentials of an effective traceability program.
Using measuring devices of known accuracy–and this may include computer-assisted measuring and test equipment–is essential in the verification process. Maintaining a calibration history of this equipment and documented proof that it’s reviewed and verified periodically underlies the entire metrology system.
Detailed first-article inspections are frequently performed to demonstrate product conformance to engineering requirements. Documenting the actual inspection and test results is an established method of demonstrating initial item acceptance.
When things don’t go as planned, AS9100 gives directions for controlling and disposing nonconforming material. This includes specific requirements for contacting the customer for authorization when using or repairing a product that doesn’t conform to engineering requirements (pg. 2).
As can be seen, the requirements within AS9100 are very thorough. In so doing it enforces a quality atmosphere of the manufacturer that allows for the traceability of materials, parts, appliances, products, aircraft, engines and or propellers from “womb to tomb”. It is by far the closest non regulatory certification that encompasses those quality control requirements of Part 21.

FARs
Although not explicitly stated, certain Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) have been written that require civil aircraft (i.e., aircraft not flown for military/public use) be properly certified in order to operate in the NAS for commercial purposes. These FARs as presented below are interpreted in the context of promoting aviation safety to ensure that only those civil aircraft, properly certified, are found to be airworthy. In the case of UAVs, this interpretation includes those supporting UASs essential for the safe operation of the civil aircraft or UAV.
Since an airframe cannot fly until it is built, an analysis of the regulatory requirements of the manufacturing quality system should be of first order.
Part 21
Part 21-Certification Procedures for Products, Articles, and Parts, will show the certification requirements of an aircraft found to be airworthy and approved to operate as a civil aircraft in the NAS. Excerpts from Part 21 are taken from the following reference: Sec. 21.1, (Apr 16, 2011).
Sec. 21.1 Applicability
(b) For the purposes of this part--
(1) Airworthiness approval means a document issued by the FAA for an aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or article which certifies that the aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or article conforms to its approved design and is in a condition for safe operation;
(2) Article means a material, part, component, process, or appliance;
(3) Commercial part means an article that is listed on an FAA-approved Commercial Parts List included in a design approval holder's Instructions for Continued Airworthiness required by Sec. 21.50;
(4) Design approval means a type certificate (including amended and supplemental type certificates) or the approved design under a Part Manufacturer Approval (PMA), Technical Standard Order (TSO) authorization, letter of TSO design approval, or other approved design;
(5) Product means an aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller
Subpart G Production Certificates
Sec. 21.135
Requirements for issuance.
An applicant is entitled to a production certificate if the Administrator finds, after examination of the supporting data and after inspection of the organization and production facilities, that the applicant has complied with Secs. 21.139 and 21.143.
Sec. 21.139
Quality control.
The applicant must show that he has established and can maintain a quality control system for any product, for which he requests a production certificate, so that each article will meet the design provisions of the pertinent type certificate
Sec. 21.143
Quality control data requirements; prime manufacturer.
(a) Each applicant must submit, for approval, data describing the inspection and test procedures necessary to ensure that each article produced conforms to the type design and is in a condition for safe operation, including as applicable--
(1) A statement describing assigned responsibilities and delegated authority of the quality control organization, together with a chart indicating the functional relationship of the quality control organization to management and to other organizational components, and indicating the chain of authority and responsibility within the quality control organization;
(2) A description of inspection procedures for raw materials, purchased items, and parts and assemblies produced by subsidiary manufacturers, including methods used to ensure acceptable quality of parts and assemblies that cannot be completely inspected for conformity and quality when delivered to the prime manufacturer's plant;
(3) A description of the methods used for production inspection of individual parts and complete assemblies, including the identification of any special manufacturing processes involved, the means used to control the processes, the final test procedure for the complete product, and, in the case of aircraft, a copy of the manufacturer's production flight test procedures and check off list;
(4) An outline of the materials review system, including the procedure for recording review board decisions and disposing of rejected parts;
(5) An outline of a system for informing company inspectors of current changes in engineering drawings, specifications, and quality control procedures; and
(6) A list or chart showing the location and type of inspection stations.
(b) Each prime manufacturer shall make available to the Administrator information regarding all delegation of authority to subsidiary manufacturers to make major inspections of parts or assemblies for which the prime manufacturer is responsible.
Sec. 21.175 Airworthiness certificates: classification

(a) Standard airworthiness certificates are airworthiness certificates issued for aircraft type certificated in the normal, utility, acrobatic, commuter, or transport category, and for manned free balloons, and for aircraft designated by the [FAA] as special classes of aircraft.
(b) Special airworthiness certificates are primary restricted, limited, light-sport, and provisional airworthiness certificates, special flight permits, and experimental certificates.
Part 91 General Operating and Flight Rules
Sec. 91.7 Civil aircraft airworthiness

(a) No person may operate a civil aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition.
(b) The pilot in command of a civil aircraft is responsible for determining whether that aircraft is in condition for safe flight. The pilot in command shall discontinue the flight when unairworthy mechanical, electrical, or structural conditions occur
Sec. 3.5 Statements about products, parts, appliances and materials
(a) Definitions. The following terms will have the stated meanings when used in this section: Airworthy means the aircraft conforms to its type design and is in a condition for safe operation
(d) The provisions of §3.5(b) and §3.5(c) shall not apply if a person can show that the product is airworthy or that the product, part, appliance or material is acceptable for installation on a type-certificated product
Expectations
Sub sec. 21.1 states that products such as aircraft, engine, propeller or articles are deemed airworthy if found to conform to their approved design and are in a condition for safe operation and that design approval has been issued under a type certificate (including amended and supplemental type certificates) or the approved design under a Part Manufacturer Approval (PMA), Technical Standard Order (TSO) authorization, letter of TSO design approval, or other approved design. Having established the basis of what a product is and the requirement for the design approval the requirements can now be clarified in how to proceed in presenting the approved design and apply for application to produce on the basis of having an approved quality system. Sub sec. 21.135 states that an applicant is entitled to a production certificate if the FAA finds that they have complied with 21.139 and 21.143. Both of which are clear requirements for an approved quality system.
The expectation of the general public and even those that enforce the FARs in the interest of safety for that of UAS commercial operation in the NAS, is that the FAA will publish rules and regulations similar to those of manned commercial aviation. Certain limitations or exemptions to the current rules will have to be taken into account due to the nature of the unmanned systems. While the expanded use of UAS presents great opportunities, it also presents significant challenges as unmanned aircraft systems are inherently different from manned aircraft (JPDO, 2013, pg.6). The FAA recently published their UAS Comprehensive Plan and UAS Roadmap 2013. The UAS Comprehensive Plan sets the overarching, interagency goals, objectives, and approach to integrating UAS into the NAS (JPDO, 2013, pg. 3). What the Comprehensive Plan does not do is supersede current government rules and regulations. All Government agencies in coordination with developing UAS policy will comply with their own processes, policies, and standards regarding airworthiness, pilot, aircrew and maintenance personnel certification and recurrent training (JPDO, 2013, pg. 9). This particular statement requires additional clarification, wherein it references standards regarding airworthiness, this is specific to certification requirements or what has been discussed, approved quality systems.
Although aviation regulations have been developed generically for all aircraft, until recently these efforts were not done with UAS specifically in mind. This presents certain challenges because the underlying assumptions that existed during the previous efforts may not now fully accommodate UAS operations. As an example, current regulations address security requirements for cockpit doors. However, these same regulations lack a legal definition for what a “cockpit” is or where it is located. This presents a challenge for UAS considering that the cockpit or “control station” may be located in an office building, in a vehicle, or outside with no physical boundaries. Applying current cockpit door security regulations to UAS may require new rulemaking, guidance, or a combination of both (First, 2013, pg.16).
While the FAA develops special permits to allow operations in the NAS, current airworthiness standards can be considered for type certification. In the long-term, UAS that are designed to a standard and built to conform to the design may be integrated into the NAS as fully certificated aircraft (First, 2013, pg. 22). Provided the long term still requires an approved quality system.
Detailed consideration of UAS in the certification process will be limited in number until such time as a broad and significant consideration is given to existing standards, regulations, and policy. This will be facilitated by UAS manufacturers making application for type design approval to the FAA. For type design approval, UAS designers must show they meet acceptable safety levels for the basic UAS design, and operators must employ certified systems that enable compliance with standardized air traffic operations and contingency/emergency procedures for UAS. Because the UAS community is well established under its current operational assumptions, it is unlikely the FAA or UAS industry will establish an entire set of design standards from scratch. As additional UAS airworthiness options are considered and UAS airworthiness design and operational standards are developed, type certification may be more efficiently and effectively achieved (First, 2013, pg. 26).

Alternative Actions
There will be incremental increases in NAS access based on rigorous safety mitigations of current UAS that were previously developed and built without approved industry or governmental standards (First, 2013). The FAA has initiated the development of a Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) to govern operation of low-flying sUAS within visual line-of-sight that are used for commercial purposes. The SFAR will provide a process for sUAS to operate in the NAS under low-risk conditions without undergoing the case-by-case approval process that is currently required. Such guidance could enable sUAS users to initiate or continue operations that do not present a safety threat to the public or to other aircraft prior to the finalization of complete certification regulations for all classes of UAS (Chesebro, 2011). Experimental certificates and COAs will always be viable methods for accessing the NAS, but typically come with constraints and limitations and do not allow for commercial operation (First, 2013).
Having presented some of the basic quality standards for which current UAS are developed both for the military and public operations and having presented the current regulatory requirements for manned aircraft to be considered airworthy, Type-Certified and issued an Airworthiness Certificate. It should be apparent that before any sUAS makes application for civil operations in the NAS, they must have been manufactured and subsequently certified under an FAA approved Quality System. Certification of UAS will evolve as future technologies evolve and will be consistent with other aircraft airworthiness and operational approval processes, adding platform capabilities to the UAS through data analyses and trending, which will identify areas for change and improvement in operations, human factors, communication links, and maintenance (First, 2013).

Recommendation
“Because the UAS community is well established under its current operational assumptions, it is unlikely the FAA or UAS industry will establish an entire set of design standards from scratch. As additional UAS airworthiness options are considered and UAS airworthiness design and operational standards are developed, type certification may be more efficiently and effectively achieved” (First, 2013, p. 26). In meeting the anticipated growth for commercial UAS operation in the NAS within the next five years, the FAA might consider it beneficial to fast track those sUAS applicants that hold dual accreditation in ISO 9000 / AS9100. By virtue of their accreditation alone, those facilities would have data to substantiate the viability of their systems and might possibly bypass the regulatory requirement of establishing an approved quality system before any and all products produced are presented to the FAA and deemed airworthy. Unfortunately, this recommendation can only be viewed as just that, by a student of MAS/UAS studies that knows that the regulatory bureaucracy takes forever and is made by decisions that go well beyond the scope of what can be analyzed here. In closing, The FAA expects to gain experience in applying the existing airworthiness regulations during the type certification process with early UAS adopters and by taking into account industry and Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) inputs, and future experience with UAS type certification projects, the FAA will review and revise as necessary the existing airworthiness regulations to ensure UAS safety (First, 2013).

References
ANSI (2013) About ANSI Overview Retrieved from http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview/overview.aspx?menuid=1
Austin, R. (2010). Unmanned Aircraft Systems: UAVS Design, Development, and Deployment. Chichester, West Sussex, U.K: Wiley.
Barker E. M. (2012) Aerospace’s AS9100 QMS Standard Retrieved from http://www.qualitydigest.com/magazine/2002/may/article/aerospaces-as9100-qms-standard.html#
Chesebro, J (2011) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Retrieved from http://www.trade.gov/mas/manufacturing/oaai/build/groups/public/@tg_oaai/documents/webcontent/tg_oaai_003781.pdf
Code of Federal Regulations (Amdt. 3-1, Eff. 10/17/2005) Part 3 General Requirements Sec. 3.5 Statements about products, parts, appliances and materials Retrieved from http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgFAR.nsf/0/9C6DBA5E134BF637862575BB006D1CBD?OpenDocument
Code of Federal Regulations (n.d.) Part 91 General Operating and Flight Rules Sec. 91.7 Civil aircraft airworthiness Retrieved from http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgFAR.nsf/0/27865155C48434A6852566CF00612316?OpenDocument
DARC (2013) Drones & Aerial Robotics Conference Law & Policy Guidebook Retrieved From https://droneconference.org/darc2013_guidebook.pdf
Dorr, L., Duquette, A., (2013) Fact Sheet -Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=14153
Final (2012) Expanding Use of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Arctic Implementation Plan FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/sUAS_Arctic_Plan.pdf
First Edition (2013) Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/uas_roadmap_2013.pdf
Hashmi, S.Y., (2012) What is Commercial off the Shelf (COTS)? Retrieved from http://technewscast.com/technology/articles/commercial-shelf-cots/
ISO (n.d.) ISO 9000 - Quality management Retrieved from http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/management-standards/iso_9000.htm
JPDO (2013) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Comprehensive Plan a Report on the Nation’s UAS Path Forward Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agi/reports/media/UAS_Comprehensive_Plan.pdf
JSC Group (2013) Commercial off the Shelf Retrieved from http://www.jscgroup.com/commercial-off-the-shelf.html
MAC (2013) The Infamous MIL-SPEC Standard Retrieved from http://www.thebangswitch.com/the-infamous-mil-spec-standard/
Sec. 21.1 (Apr 16, 2011) Part 21 Certification Procedures for Products, Articles, and Parts Retrieved from http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgFAR.nsf/0/D503D14EB7344D10862576E4004C7642?OpenDocument
Thornton, R.K., (2001), DOT/FAA/AR-01/41 Review of Pending Guidance and Industry Findings on Commercial off-the-Shelf (COTS) Electronics in Airborne System, Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/air_software/media/01-41_COTS.pdf
Webb W.D., (2001) Creating and Maintaining Safety-Agency Reports Retrieved from http://www.ce-mag.com/archive/01/09/webb.html
Wikipedia (2013) American National Standards Institute Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ANSI

Thursday, December 5, 2013

UAS Missions

Possibly the most familiar of Air Force missions would be that conducted by the long-range / long endurance MALE and HALE UAS Predator series and Global Hawk (Austin, 2010). Initially both systems were designed for reconnaissance only but due to evolving mission requirements, the Predator was upgraded with strike capabilities and subsequently renamed the Reaper (Austin, 2010). The Army has taken to UAV use in situations where covert action would mean that having boots on the ground would ultimately put troops in harms way. An example of covert reconnaissance mission is to establish the extent of enemy positions or movements or, in another scenario, the infiltration of insurgents into friendly territory (Austin, 2010). By the use of UASs, forward controllers are no longer necessary. So as not to alert the enemy these systems are usually catapult launched or of the VTOL UAV type capable of operating close to theatre of operations (Austin, 2010) and allowing for quick recovery. The Luna or Sparrow are of the fixed wing close range catapult launched type systems and are better suited for operations up to about 50 km and moderate weather (Austin, 2010).
Although the platforms previously mentioned are currently in use by the military, their proven track record sets the foundation for use by the public sector. How the platforms will be ultimately certified and accepted as airworthy to conduct commercial operations in the NAS remains to be defined. Furthermore, public concern about unmanned aircraft flying around the skies violating privacy issues and possibly crashing onto people and property or colliding with other aircraft is perfectly understandable (Austin, 2010). “Moreover, FAA’s authority over specific uses of civilian unmanned aircraft appears limited so long as safety and national security are not compromised, raising additional concerns that future drone operations could lead to complaints and lawsuits over noise, intrusiveness, and interference with the use and enjoyment of public or private property” (Elias, 2012, p. 2).
References
Austin, R. (2010). Unmanned aircraft systems: UAVS design, development, and deployment. Chichester, West Sussex, U.K: Wiley.
Elias, B (2012). Pilotless Drones: Background and Considerations for Congress Regarding Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42718.pdf